BEIRUT: A stormy August 2004 meeting with President Bashar Assad was the turning point in Rafik Hariri’s relations with Syria and prompted the former prime minister to launch a nationwide election campaign in order to gain more control in Parliament, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon heard Thursday. In his first testimony in front of the court, former MP Salim Diab, who was Hariri’s campaign manager, said it was immediately after the notorious Damascus meeting that the former premier decided to run a massive electoral campaign ahead of 2005 parliamentary polls.
Diab said the former prime minister was stung by Assad’s threat that he would “break Lebanon” on Hariri’s head if he did not acquiesce to the demands of Damascus, obey his orders and back the extension of pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud.
The extension, which was granted in September 2004, led to a breakdown in relations between Assad and Hariri and the passage of Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon – aimed at Syria – and the disarmament of all militias – aimed at Syria’s ally Hezbollah.
According to Diab, Hariri was uncharacteristically “nervous” after the Damascus meeting and became adamant that he needed to increase his representation in Parliament in order to augment his influence. “It would help him execute what he wanted,” Diab explained.
Assad’s threats also prompted Hariri to reject pro-Syrian candidates Damascus had ordered him to include on his electoral list, Diab said – a total first.
“Hariri wasn’t going to accept the [names] this time and he said that he would replace them with his own candidates,” Diab explained, saying that previously the former premier had acquiesced to Syria’s demands regarding candidate lists.
For example, Diab said former Beirut MP Adnan Arakji, who was known for his close ties to Syria, ran on Hariri’s list for the 1996 parliamentary polls after Syria had requested him along with two other candidates.
The Syrian leadership repeatedly meddled with electoral lists, Diab said, and ruled out the former lawmaker himself as a candidate for the 1996 polls.
They later on complied with Diab’s nomination after Hariri threatened to withdraw from the parliamentary race if he wasn’t accepted by the Syrians as a candidate, he said.
By January 2005, one month before Hariri’s assassination, his colossal campaign included at least 150 offices across Akkar, Tripoli, Central Bekaa and West Bekaa, Sidon, the Chouf, Baabda and Beirut.
The number of employees working on the campaign, which started out with roughly 500, was expected to reach 16,000 had the prime minister survived until April, a month before elections were set to be held, Diab noted.
The campaign manager also spoke about the atmosphere that prevailed in the months leading up to Hariri’s death.
Tensions became especially high after the attempted assassination of former Minister Marwan Hamade in October 2004, and it became known in their circle that “the attack was a message to Hariri,” he said.
Following the assassination attempt, ISF Information Branch head Brig. Gen. Wissam Hasan and Yehia al-Arab, the head of Hariri’s personal security, repeatedly asked Diab to caution the prime minister against making “unnecessary trips” due to the threat to his life.
The three were warning Hariri of this risk as of November 2004, Diab said, but the former premier was stubborn and dismissed the threats.
According to Diab, threats to Hariri’s life were not considered “hush-hush business”; it was known to a lot of people that he was “looked at as a target.”
His colleagues even advised him against going to Parliament on the day of his assassination, Diab said.
The campaign manager also noted that the prime minister was wary of his phone being tapped.
“Every time someone would call he would say: ‘Why are you talking to me over the phone? Everyone is going to listen.’”
The only safe line of communication was a hotline in the Qoreitem palace known as the “Data Line,” Diab said, adding that the premier used it to communicate with officials outside of Lebanon.
During the week before his assassination, Diab noted that Hariri was “not normal.” The campaign manager, who last saw Hariri a day before his death, said that the usually unflappable premier was “preoccupied” in a way that he hadn’t seen him before.
Diab’s testimony is part of the political evidence being presented before the U.N.-backed tribunal tasked with prosecuting those responsible for killing Hariri and 21 others in a bombing in Beirut on Feb. 14, 2005.
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